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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
broadcasting of commentaries concerning the plaintiff's allegedly unfair
business practices. The court did not definitively decide whether the broad-
casts constituted slander or libel. No other cases on this question have
appeared to date in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals
in Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co.78 treated a motion picture as libel but
did not define it to be such.
It would appear that the Illinois courts have not yet been called upon to
rule on the more difficult aspects of the distinction between slander and libel.
Those factual situations before the court have been rather simply resolved
on the established common law distinctions recognized universally.
Projecting the dictum stated in Ward v. Winnebago, perhaps Illinois
will concentrate upon the deliberateness and permanent form aspect of
written material. An interesting statement, also dictum, in Whitby v. As-
sociates Discount Corporation,7 9 namely, "A defamation designed for visual
perception is a libel; an oral defamation is slander" might indicate the
future adoption of the audio-visual theory.
MICHAEL D. SAVAGE
PUBLICATION
One of the essential elements of a cause of action in libel or slander is
that the alleged defamatory words be published; that is, be communicated
to a person other than the plaintiff himself.' The reason for the rule is that
since the interest protected in defamation is the plaintiff's reputation, there
can be no injury unless the defamation reaches some third person. Hence,
the communication to the person defamed alone does not amount to a
publication sufficient to sustain a civil libel for damages. 2 And, although it
is not necessary that the plaintiff be mentioned by name in the publication,
it must be understood to refer to him.8
Generally, the defamatory words must be heard or read by some third
person with understanding. If that test is met, the publication may be in a
foreign language, 4 or in the presence of small children. Thus, in Hammond
v. Stewart,5 wherein plaintiff was called a "whore" in the presence of her
small children, the oldest of whom was six years of age, the court held that
there was sufficient publication.
78 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
79 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482 (3d Dist. 1965).
1 See Prosser, Torts § 108 (3d ed. 1964). See also McLaughlin v. Schnellbacker, 65
Ill. App. 50 (3d Dist. 1895).
2 Elliott v. McDonough, 344 Ill. App. 211, 100 N.E.2d 803 (2d Dist. 1951).
3 Algozino v. Welch, 345 Ill. App. 135, 102 N.E.2d 255 (1st Dist. 1951).
4 Nolte v. Herter, 65 Ill. App. 430 (3d Dist. 1895).
5 72 Ill. App. 512 (3d Dist. 1898).
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However, where the words are clear and obvious in meaning, the cases
have not required an actual showing that the words were heard and under-
stood, so long as the words were spoken in the hearing and presence of a
third person.6
It is neither necessary to prove that third persons believe the matter
published, nor that the publication was to a stranger. Thus, it is sufficient
if the publication is to members of the plaintiff's family. In Miller v. John-
son,7 plaintiff brought an action for allegedly being called a thief by defen-
dant. The words were spoken in front of the plaintiff's family, and defen-
dant contended, therefore, that this would not be sufficient to constitute
publication. In affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, the Illinois Supreme
Court said:
Evidence that the slanderous words were uttered in the presence of
members of plaintiff's family is proof of publication of the slander.
As much protection is due a man's reputation in the presence of
his family as in the presence of strangers. Persons being present,
whether kindred or strangers, the words may be said to have been
spoken concerning plaintiff in the technical sense. However this
may be, it is proven the slanderous words were uttered in the
presence and hearing of members of plaintiff's family, and that, in
law, is itself a publication of the slander.8
It is not necessary that the manner of publication be specified in the
complaint. 9 Such things as wills,' 0 lithographs," and wage assignments12
have satisfied the requirement of publication, as have letters,13 newspaper
publications, 14 and oral statements. 15
Publication may be either by the defendant himself or through the act
of a third person, if authorized by the defendant. The rules governing the
principal-agent relationship apply and the principal will be liable for the
defamations made by his servant in the scope of his employment. This
principle is demonstrated in Lion Oil Co. v. Sinclair.16 In that case, defen-
dant's agent, a regional manager of sales, held a meeting with his salesmen.
Following the meeting, the participants began telling plaintiff's client that
6 Frank v. Kaminsky, 109 Ill. 26 (1884).
7 79 Ill. 58 (1875).
8 Id. at 60.
9 McLaughlin v. Schnellbacker, 65 Ill. App. 50 (3d Dist. 1895).
10 Though Illinois has no case in point, the rule in some jurisdictions is that the
probate of a will is publication sufficient to render the estate of the testator liable in an
action for libel. See, Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu, 201 Ore. 406, 266 P.2d 686 (1951). Generally,
the executor who "publishes" the will is not subjected to personal liability. See Harris
v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914); Nolin v. Nolin, - Ill. App.
2d -, 215 N.E.2d 21 (3d Dist. 1966).
" People v. Beauharnais, 408 111. 512, 97 N.E.2d 343 (1951).
12 Hudson v. Slack Furniture Co., 318 Ill. App. 226, 47 N.E.2d 502 (4th Dist. 1943).
13 McLaughlin v. Schnellbacker, supra note 9.
14 Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 111. App. 570 (1st Dist. 1882).
15 Hammond v. Stewart, 72 Ill. App. 512 (3d Dist. 1898).
16 252 Ill. App. 92 (1st Dist. 1929).
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plaintiff corporation was on "its last legs" and would be unable to supply
its customers with gasoline. The jury found the defamation was precon-
ceived by defendant and made by the sales manager at his meeting. Judg-
ment was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court for the plaintiff.
Every repetition of the defamation is a publication in itself, and
constitutes a separate cause of action, or, if the repetition is made in an
attempted justification or defense, is considered an aggravation of the
original publication, where not in good faith.' 7 Thus, in O'Malley v. Illinois
Publishing & Printing Co.,' 8 defendant published an article alleging that
plaintiff was a divekeeper and notorious gambling boss, who was head of an
organization to colonize illegal voters. After commencement of the suit,
defendant printed another article reciting the same allegations and chiding
plaintiff for denying the allegations and suing over the matter. At the trial,
a reporter testified for defendant and recited the allegations, which were
based on rumor. Said the court in affirming judgment for plaintiff:
The plea of justification was in law a further republication of
the libel and the plea of not guilty admitted the falsity of the
charge.... The repetition of the libel tended to show malice in the
publication of the original libel, and these republications were
proper for the jury to take into consideration in aggravation of
damages.' 9
Defendant's attempt to justify the speaking of the words may entail
repeating the defamation before the jury; this should not, in itself, aggravate
the damages. However, if defendant pleads a justification with the view of
injuring the plaintiff further, or without any expectation of supporting the
plea by proof, the jury may properly consider the plea as a republication
of the defamation, and as a ground for increasing the damages. Good faith,
or lack of it, is a question for the jury.20
Where the matter is repeated or republished by someone other than
the defendant, he may be charged with the republishing if he authorized
or intended it to be republished, as where he gives the matter to a news-
paper. However, if the defendant neither authorized nor knew that his
statements would be republished, he is not liable for a second publication.
Such was the case in Clifford v. Cochrane.21 In that case, plaintiff brought
an action for a republication of the alleged libel. The article in question
had been republished in the San Francisco Chronicle. The declaration set
forth that plaintiff was an architect hired to superintend the building of a
17 Harbison v. Shook, 41 111. 141 (1866).
18 194 Ill. App. 544 (st Dist. 1915).
19 Id. at 555.
20 Sloan v. Petrie, 15 Ill. 425 (1854). Here defendant attempted to justify his statement
that plaintiff had committed perjury in a prior action. During the trial, defendant offered
evidence to prove the statement. The court affirmed the decision below that the defen-
dant was acting in good faith and consequently did not enhance plaintiff's damages.
21 10 Ill. App. 570 (1st Dist. 1882).
LIBEL AND SLANDER IN ILLINOIS
new city hall in San Francisco. The declaration alleged that the article in
question, which was an interview of the defendant, depicted plaintiff as
mentally and otherwise incompetent to handle the job. As a result, plaintiff
lost the job. The article was printed in the Chicago Times and subsequently
in the Chronicle. Regarding the republication, the court said:
There is no allegation that the defendant authorized or knew that
his statements to the reporter of the Times were to be republished
in that paper. The allegation is, that he spoke the words knowing
they were to be published in the Chicago Times. By submitting to
be interviewed, and knowing that the interview was to appear in
the Times, he impliedly authorized its publication in that paper,
and is therefore responsible for such damages as were the natural
and proximate consequences of that publication. . . We do not
think such republication can be regarded as the necessary, or the
natural and proximate consequence of the publication in the
Times.... Each person can only be liable for the publication made
by him. If one makes an oral publication, and another repeats it
without authority from the speaker, the first publisher is not liable
for the repetition .... The dictation to incur any responsibility for
a subsequent publication of the language dictated, must be made
with an intent or request that the language so dictated shall be
subsequently published.22
Historically, each delivery and sale of an article containing defamatory
material was considered a publication, which, defenses aside, gave rise to a
separate cause of action. Such was the rule until the 1948 decision of
Winrod v. Time.23 In that case, plaintiff brought action on April 13, 1943,
to recover damages for an alleged libel printed and published in an issue of
defendant's magazine on April 13, 1942. Defendant moved to strike the
complaint on the ground that although the publication bore the date
printed on its cover it had actually been published at least two days earlier,
and hence the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
Attached to defendant's motion were affidavits that throughout the United
States subscribers received their copies of the issue on or prior to April 11,
1942, and that copies appeared on the newsstands by April l1th. Defen-
dant's motion to strike was sustained and, on appeal, the decision was
affirmed. Said the court:
, To avoid multiplicity of suits and to make effective the statute
of limitations, publication has been redefined in the light of the
realities of this century and is now defined so as to include all the
steps in the economic process by which news is disseminated ...
22 Id. at 575.
23 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1st Dist. 1948). See also Wheeler v. Dell Publishing
Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962). In that action, plaintiff sued defendant under diversity
jurisdiction in the Seventh Circuit for damages for libel growing out of the novel
"Anatomy of a Murder." Plaintiff alleged she was the person depicted as raped in the
novel. Among the defenses was the statute of limitations. The court specifically distin-
guished the rule announced in Winrod v. Time since, in this instance, subsequent to the
initial printing of the issue in question, there were reprintings by the publisher; hence,
there was a republication.
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Therefore, the composition, printing, and distribution of libelous
material constitute only one cause of action. The rule of law to be
applied in such circumstances is that the one issue of a newspaper
or magazine, although it consists of thousands of copies widely
distributed, gives rise to one cause of action, there being but one
publication, and the statute of limitation runs from the date of
such publication. The number of copies is considered as aggra-
vating the seriousness of the publication, and therefore, being
evidence of the extent of the injury, goes only to the matter of
damages .... A careful examination of the cases leads to the con-
clusion that the decided weight of authority in this country is,
where large distributions of published matter are involved, that the
cause of action accrues, for the purpose of the statute of limita-
tions, upon the first publication, when the issue goes into circula-
tion generally .... 24
Illinois adopted by statute July 22, 1959, the Uniform Single Publica-
tion Act.2 5 The law statutized what had been the rule under Winrod v.
Time,26 and goes further, encompassing the use of air waves and the
showing of motion pictures. Hence, the plaintiff is held to "one cause of
action for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded
upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance. ."27 To date,
there are no Illinois cases construing the statute.
RONALD HANKIN
MALICE
Malice is the gist of the action of libel, and it may exist in fact or it
may be implied in law. Malice in fact is a "formed design of doing mischief
to another person,"' while malice in law has been defined as a "presump-
tion of law and dispenses with proof of malice when words raise such
presumption and does not imply ill will, personal malice or hatred to
injure another .... -2 Words amounting to a libel or slander per se neces-
sarily import damages and malice in legal contemplation, so these elements
24 ld. at 61, 78 N.E.2d at 709-10.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 126, § 11 (1963). "No person shall have more than one cause of
action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded
upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a
newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one
broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery
in any action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all
jurisdictions."
26 Winrod v. Time, supra note 23.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 126, § 11 (1963).
1 Cook v. East Shore Publishing Co., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 751 (4th Dist. 1945).
2 Van Norman v. Peoria Journal Star, 31 Ill. App. 2d 314, 175 N.E.2d 805 (2d Dist.
1961).
